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Abstract
Human Resources officers report occupational shortage to be the main cause of unfilled
vacancies. Yet, it is not clear whether these are empty complaints or actually lead to
effective wage and employment adjustments over time. By crossing data from the UK
Employer Skill Survey with the UK Labor Force Survey, we show that shortage only
leads to wage and employment adjustments for non-routine occupations in England,
while no such adjustment occurs for routine occupations. This result is robust to
several empirical specifications and varying levels of aggregation. Moreover, firms
facing routine occupation shortage are more likely to outsource these vacancies, instead
of raising wages or increasing recruitment intensity. In all, these results are consistent
with the phenomenon of job polarization and the secular decline of the routine sector.
To explore the likely mechanisms at play, we construct a stylized model of search and
matching, where labor market islands are characterized by location and occupation
types. We demonstrate how, when faced with local labor market shocks, wages in the
skill-intensive non-routine sector increase more in response to shortage, thereby raising
employment and mitigating the initial shortage, at the expense of the routine sector.
JEL classification: J21, J23, J61, J62.
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1. Introduction
In 2016, the Conference Board, the US-based organization for business leaders, declared
labor shortage to be the key challenge for CEOs in the near future. The lack of workers to
fill necessary jobs has stirred much anxiety among policy makers in recent times. Indeed,
outside the neoclassical world, labor demand and supply do not clear instantaneously. This
is due to frictions in the labor market that cause a discrepancy between the optimal level of
employment and the actual one so as to generate distortions in the allocation of labor and
in wage setting. In fact, in the most developed economies, anecdotal evidence suggests that
a growing number of firms report find it harder to fill their posted vacancies for certain jobs,
a phenomenon we call occupational shortage. Yet, it has been neither clear nor well explored
in the literature if the perceived persistent inability to fill vacancies is just an unsubstanti-
ated complaint or if it actually leads to effective adjustments in wages and employment that
eventually clear the market. For these reasons, this paper aims to shed light on the nature
of occupational shortage and is the first, to our knowledge, that shows how the interaction
of the former with labor market outcomes. To what extent do wages, hours worked and
employment respond to changes in occupational shortage? What accounts for differential
responses across occupational groups?
In order to address these questions, we begin by examining the empirical evidence. First,
we use English micro-data from the UK Employer Skill Survey (ESS) and construct, for each
local labor market, occupation group and industry, a measure of shortage, note the reported
consequences of shortage and the adopted strategies to counteract it. In particular, we con-
sider 9 geographical markets in England - the North-East, North-West, Yorkshire and the
Humber, West Midlands, East Midlands, East of England, London, South-East and South-
West, 4 broad occupation groups - Non-Routine Cognitive (e.g. Managers, professionals and
related jobs), Routine Cognitive (e.g. Sales and office jobs), Routine Manual (e.g. Produc-
tion and blue-collar jobs) and Non-Routine Manual (e.g. Service and pink-collar jobs), as
well as 14 industry categories. Second, we merge this information with data from the Labor
Force Survey (LFS) to study the extent to which labor markets, upon experiencing a higher
shortage, adjust. This exercise is carried out on varying levels of aggregation and under
different empirical specifications. Third, we investigate whether different types of workers
are able to move into pockets of higher shortage and benefit from higher wages. These
questions are crucial for a broad understanding of the dynamics of the labor demand and
supply, the growing importance of skills, the increase of inequality in both wage and mobility.
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From our analysis, we find that occupational shortage varies across time, markets and
jobs heterogeneously. In addition, different responses to shortage exist between occupation
groups. Indeed, we find that wages, employment and hours worked increases in response
to an increase in shortage only for Non-Routine Cognitive (NRC) and Non-Routine Manual
(NRM) jobs, while no such response is observed for both Routine Manual (RM) and Routine
Cognitive (RC) jobs. This result is robust to different levels of aggregation and empirical
specifications. Possible phenomena that could explain these findings include the systemic
misreporting of shortage by firms for routine jobs, different levels of matching efficiency
across occupation types and the phenomenon of job polarization, well-documented by the
likes of Acemoglu and Autor (2011a), which is linked to the secular decline in routine jobs.
Our evidence rules out the first two explanations and suggests that the phenomenon of job
polarization, driven by routinization, may be at play.
In addition, we find that differential mobility patterns across worker groups. In particu-
lar, NRC workers are most likely to move to pockets of the labor market with higher shortage
and wages, compared to the other worker groups. It seems, therefore, that workers in other
occupation groups are somehow less willing or able to migrate into higher shortage pockets.
While preliminary, these results together have profound implications for between-occupation
inequality, the future composition of jobs as well as job mobility.
In order to rationalize our empirical findings, we then construct a simple model of search
and matching. We consider separate local labor market (islands) where there are only two
types of occupation, routine and non-routine. Within each island, firms choose the segment
of the market in which to post vacancies while heterogeneous workers decide the type of job
to search for. In addition, upon deciding on the type of job for which to search, workers
also decide whether or not to migrate to a different island. This is a simple extension of
the standard dynamic directed search model as discussed in Guerrieri, Benoit, Kircher, and
Wright (2017) and Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright (2005). In equilibrium, there is a threshold
above which workers search in the non-routine sector, as well as a threshold beyond which
they decide to migrate. Upon calibrating our model, we demonstrate how local labor market
shocks that are on average relatively favorable to the non-routine sector can lead to shortage
in both the non-routine and routine islands. Yet, while wages and employment increase in
response to shortage in non-routine islands, leading to a rapid clearing of shortage in the
non-routine islands, this response is muted in routine markets, thereby causing shortage to
persist for far longer than in their non-routine counterparts. Furthermore, the existence of
mobility costs that are decreasing with respect to skill exacerbates the discrepancy between
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the non-routine and routine markets. Specifically, higher-skilled workers, who populate non-
routine occupations, are more able to migrate across islands in response to local market
shocks, relative to less-skilled workers.
The above result therefore serves as a validation of the hypothesis of Skill-Biased Tech-
nical change. Indeed, it is through the lens of SBTC that we are able to provide a coherent
account of why wage and employment adjustments are observed in response to shortage in
non-routine occupations, but not in routine occupations. As such, we can therefore conclude
that Skill-Biased Technical change (SBTC) not only accounts for wage and employment
growth in non-routine occupations, as documented in the existing literature, but is also the
main contributor to the uneven adjustment of labor markets to shortage.
In short, the contribution of this paper is two-fold: (i) it shows that only non-routine
markets are able to adjust to shortage, and that (ii) SBTC can account not only for the po-
larization of the labor market, as documented in the previous literature, bu also can explain
the inability of routine markets in mitigating shortage.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the literature on labor
market shortage and mismatch. Section 3 introduces the data, the definition of shortage and
provides some descriptive results. In Section 4 describes our empirical strategies to study
the effect of shortages on wages, hours worked, employment as well as mobility patterns.
Section 5 presents the setup of the model and characterizes the equilibrium, while Section 6
examines its calibration. Further discussion of the model’s results is provided in Section 7.
The last Section concludes.
2. Related Literature
The fundamental law of demand and supply states that prices should adjust to clear the
market. As such, the question of shortage should not pose a problem, since wages should
rise to eliminate the excess in labor demand so as to clear the market. Nevertheless, the
existing literature has tried to reconcile reported evidence of shortage and the classical labor
market tenets.
For instance, confronting the claims of a shortage of engineers in the 1950s, Arrow and
Capron (1959) argue that engineers’ wages simply take time to adjust to clear the market,
since firms have to figure out the new equilibrium wage at which they can profitably hire
workers. In this sense, shortage can be a transitory phenomenon. Nonetheless, the authors
show that if demand were to increase continually and prices are slow to respond, a situation
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of chronic shortage could occur and would only be alleviated with a halt in the demand
increase. In a similar vein, Freeman (1975) considers the responsiveness of the supply of
physics graduates to salaries in the period from 1943 to 1975, when the demand for physi-
cists varied substantially, and finds that the number of labour market entrants with physics
degrees varied closely with salary incentives, albeit with a lag. Hence, the supply of grad-
uates eventually responded to changes in the salaries caused by shifts in demand, even if
this adjustment took some time. More recently, the issue of shortage arising from a lack of
requisite skills has also been addressed by Cappelli (2005). Addressing reports of skills short-
age among employers in the United States, he finds little concrete evidence to support their
claims. Instead, he argues that the decline of in-house training as well as current recruitment
practices are behind these reports. Moreover, he shows that in certain occupations where
reports of shortage have been most rife, wages and posted vacancies have actually declined,
contrary to the basic laws of demand and supply. Similarly, Rathelot et al. (2017) suggests
that shortage appears to be demand-side problem, as employers’ wage setting policies appear
not to reflect existing shortages.
How shortage should be measured is a matter of contention. The aforementioned pa-
pers have largely relied on anecdotal reports of shortage, partly due to a lack of empirical
measures.
Since the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) data has been made avail-
able, some authors have begun examining the ability of firms to fill their vacancies, which
could be considered a proxy for shortage. In their paper, Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger
(2013) examine the rate at which firms fill vacancies using the JOLTS data at the establish-
ment level. They find that the vacancy-filling rate varies greatly between industries, falls
with increasing employment and rises with firm growth. They also find that firms not only
influence their vacancy-filling rates via their vacancy posting decisions, but also by altering
their recruitment intensity, which they then seek to measure using a recruitment intensity
index.
However, as an indictment to ability of the JOLTS survey in documenting vacancies, the
authors find that 41.6 percent of hires actually occur at firms who do not report any vacancies.
Moreover, as vacancy duration is not provided in JOLTS, the distinction between vacancies
and persistently unfilled vacancies (i.e. shortage) is unclear. By adopting a more explicit
measure of shortage, this paper endeavours to do better in this respect using the UK dataset.
Apart from the above papers which discuss the incidence of shortage, the existing litera-
ture has also sought to explain shortage, and the lack of corresponding wage and employment
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adjustments. In fact, a line of literature on wage curves, beginning with Blanchflower and
Oswald (2005), presents evidence that areas with high unemployment are characterized by
lower wages, directly contradicting the classical model. Using microeconomic data on several
countries, including the US and countries in continental Europe, Blanchflower and Oswald
(2005) and Card, Blanchflower, and Oswald (1995) estimate the elasticity of pay to unem-
ployment to be -0.1, meaning that a one percentage point increase in unemployment lowers
wage by 0.1 percent, a finding that is robust across different countries. They rationalize this
result by adopting the model of efficiency wages. In such a setup, employers pay employees a
sufficiently high wage to discourage shirking. Since higher unemployment lowers the outside
option of the worker, employers are able to lower the wage, while still encouraging effort.
This framework could thus explain why shortages do not seem to dissipate even with higher
observed wages.
Labor market mismatch can also be considered as a potential cause of shortage. It is de-
fined as the coexistence of vacancies and the unemployed located in different labor markets.
In this respect, mismatch leads to a higher unemployment rate than what would occur if
the unemployed met and matched with unfilled vacancies. This stems from the idea that,
despite the high numbers of jobseekers, firms are unable to fill their vacancies as the unem-
ployed are searching in the ‘wrong’ markets, which can be characterized, for instance, by
geographical location, occupations or industries. Shortages in a given labor market can dis-
sipate so long as there is inter-market mobility. Looking at relative wages between different
geographic locations in the US, Topel (1986) studies how internal migration arbitrages these
wage differences to an extent. Using CPS data, Topel (1986) finds that wages are sensitive to
inter-regional labor market differences, via the channel of migration, which is in turn limited
by mobility costs. Using a dynamic model where workers’ expectations of local demand and
wages determine their decision to migrate (or not), he shows that there is continuous adjust-
ment towards the equilibrium, as workers get updates on the current and expected future
state of each local economy. Likewise, Enrico (2011) considers why persistent divergence in
wages and productivity occurs between different local labour markets in the US and explains
this using a static version of Topel (1986) with imperfect elasticity of labour and housing
supply.
Apart from geographical labor market mismatch, the literature has also considered sec-
toral and occupational mismatch. This includes Herz and Van Rens (2015), who define
mismatch unemployment as the unemployment arising from dispersion in labor market con-
ditions across labor market segments, differentiated by geography or industry. They measure
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the roles of four types of frictions that generate mismatch: worker and firm mobility costs,
wage rigidities and matching efficiency heterogeneity. They argue that both geographical
and industry mismatch are due to wage rigidity while industry mismatch is also partly ac-
counted for by limited firm mobility. They also show that states with high wages also have
low profits, implying that states that are attractive to firms are also unattractive to workers
and vice versa, resulting in inter-state mismatch unemployment and unfilled vacancies.
Shortage can also exist in a world without labor market rigidities. For instance, Shimer
(2007) shows how mismatch can exist even if wages are set competitively. Characterizing
a local labor market by occupation and geographical location and allowing for the random
allocation of jobs and workers to labour markets, he shows that at any instant, even if wages
are competitive in every market, there will be some markets with labour shortages and others
with unemployment, which would otherwise not exist in a unified labour market.
Nonetheless, the empirical evidence suggests that mismatch may not be an especially
severe phenomenon. For example, Sahin, Song, Topa, and Violante (2014) estimate that
mismatch unemployment accounts for at most one third of the increase in the unemployment
rate following the Great Recession in the US, by comparing the empirical unemployment rate
to the unemployment rate that would arise if a social planner were able to reallocate workers
between occupations and sectors such that the productivity-weighted market tightness across
labor markets were equalized. In addition, they find that mismatch unemployment accounts
for a bigger fraction of the unemployment rate among the highly-educated than the less-
educated. Similarly, Daly, Hobijn, Sahin, and Valletta (2012) show that while the natural
unemployment rate in the US increased by one percentage point compared to before the
Great recession, this rise cannot be attributed to an increase in mismatch unemployment.
In fact, they find that the increase in mismatch unemployment has been limited, and the
rise in the unemployment rate can be attributed instead to the extension of unemployment
insurance benefits during the recession. Moreover, there is some evidence from the US to
suggest that occupational and industry mobility is fairly high, which begs the question as
to whether mismatch unemployment is a persistent problem. For example, using PSID data
from 1968 to 1997, Kambourov and Manovskii (2008) find that occupational and industrial
mobility in the US is high and increasing over this period and cuts across all education levels.
Also, occupational mobility is found to be slightly pro-cyclical. Even so, one wonders if this
conjecture still holds in the present day and for other countries.
Related to this paper as well is the literature on skill-biased technical change and rou-
tinization. Starting from Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998), many authors have examined
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how SBTC has increased wage inequality between skill groups since the 1970s. More recently,
authors have pointed to how SBTC, along with routinization, can account for wage and job
polarization in several industrialized economies. The routinzation hypothesis is closely linked
to SBTC, and relates to the advent of machines that have replaced workers in routine jobs.
For instance, Acemoglu and Autor (2011b) show that over the past three decades in the
United States, due to opportunities for off-shoring and mechanization that substitutes for
the labor of routine (middle-skill) workers, employment in abstract (high-skill) and service
jobs have increased relative to that of routine (middle-skill jobs), a phenomenon they term
‘job polarization’. They also document ‘wage polarization’, a related phenomenon where the
wages of high and low earners in the wage distribution have risen in the past three decades
relative to that the median earner. The decline of routine jobs in the US labor market has
also been documented and discussed in Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003), Autor and Dorn
(2013), Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006b), Autor and Handel (2013), as well as Autor, Katz,
and Kearney (2006a).
Job polarization has also been documented in the United Kingdom. Goos and Manning
(2007) and Goos, Manning, and Salomons (2014) document the increase in employment
shares in top and bottom paid jobs, along with a decline in the wages of middling earners
relative to those of top and bottom earners, in line with the routinization seen in the United
States. While the literature has hitherto not made a link between routinization, polariza-
tion and occupational shortage, the results found in this paper suggest that the differential
responses of routine and non-routine jobs may plausibly attributed to the decline of the
routine sector.
This paper bridges the two hitherto disparate strands of literature regarding shortage
and skill-biased technical change. Indeed, apart from constructing a concrete measure of
shortage, we are also able to demonstrate how SBTC, along with routinzation, can account
for the differences between routine and non-routine sectors in their abilities to mitigate
shortage.
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics
Having discussed the literature, we now proceed to describe the data.
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3.1. Data on firms and workers
We use the UK Employer Skill Survey (ESS) and the UK Labor Force Survey (LFS) to
conduct our empirical analysis. The ESS is a firm-level survey published by the UK Commis-
sion for Employment and Skills (UKCES). It was first carried out in 1999 only for England
for a sample 26,952 firms.This sample was drawn from England’s business database, which
comprises of all business establishments in the UK with more than five employees and sample
weights are provided. It was then conducted again in 2001 and 2002 for a cross section of
firms in England. There was a hiatus until the survey was re-conducted in 2011 and 2013,
by which time it had expanded to include the whole of the UK, garnering a sample of 91,279
firms (75,255 for England alone). The survey was also conducted recently in 2015, although
the dataset has not yet been made available for that year.
Apart from basic information on the industry to which the firm belongs, the number of
employees, the regional location of the firm and its headquarters and whether it is from the
public or private sector, several questions are asked of firm respondents regarding their abil-
ity to meet their employment needs. These include the number of posted vacancies they have
at the time of the survey, the breakdown of posted vacancies according to each occupation
type, the number of vacancies they find hard-to-fill, the breakdown of hard-to-fill vacancies
according to each occupation type, why they find these vacancies hard-to-fill, the strategies
that they would adopt to try to fill those vacancies as well as the consequences they have
already faced from their inability to fill those vacancies.
The LFS is a quarterly survey of individuals’ labor market experiences that has been
conducted since 1992. It contains key information such as income, hours worked, employment
status and history, industry, region as well as on basic individual characteristics such as age
and gender. Approximately 100,000 people are interviewed at each quarterly wave, and each
individual is surveyed for five such waves until he/she drops out of the sample and is replaced.
Since the ESS does not have any data on wages and hours worked for each occupation in
the firm, it can be supplemented with the data from the LFS. In addition, the LFS provides
information on workers’ occupational and geographic mobility, which will be important for
our analysis later on.
3.2. The definition of shortage
As previously mentioned, there is no reliable measure of shortage in other commonly-
used firm-level datasets. The JOLTS, for instance, does not have any information on how
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long vacancies have been left unfilled. As such, for gauging shortage, these datasets can
only provide a ratio of hires to vacancies, which is problematic since there is no objective
threshold beyond which a shortage can be declared. On the contrary, the ESS asks firms
directly about the number of vacancies that they find difficult to fill1. While vacancy duration
was not consistently asked in the ESS as well, this direct assessment by firms is arguably a
much more reliable measure of shortage than what is given in most datasets such as JOLTS.
In addition, since this question is asked for every occupation the firm has, we are able to
construct a measure of shortage for each occupation type.
3.3. Incidence of shortage and variations over time
Table 1 presents some summary statistics on the number of vacancies and hard-to-fill
vacancies reported by firms in all waves of the survey. It also reports the share of hard-to-fill
vacancies, given by No. of hard-to-fill vacancies
Total number of vacancies
. From the table, the incidence of shortage appears
to be declining in from 1999 to 2013. Yet, shortage remains a substantial, with the fraction
of shortage averaging around 0.3 in 2013.
Heterogeneity in the incidence of shortage between occupations can also be observed
over time. Figures 1 and 2 show the short-term change in the share of hard-to-fill vacancies
between the survey waves from 1999 to 2001, and 2011 to 2013 respectively. As can be seen
from Figure 1, shortage incidence increases for NRC jobs from 1999 to 2001, while declining
for other job types over this period. From 2011 to 2013, as seen in Figure 2, shortage share
increases for all occupations and rises the most for NRM and NRC jobs. Cross-refering to
Table 1, this rise in shortage share is not so much due to a decline in reported vacancy
posting, but instead stems from an increase in the number of hard-to-fill vacancies.
From these descriptive results on the incidence and evolution of shortage over time, it is
apparent that there is some variation of shortage over time and across occupations. Appendix
A also documents the changes in shortage across industries and regions. This variation in
shortage at the region, industry and occupation level is exploited later on in our empirical
analysis.
3.4. On firms’ strategies in dealing with shortage
In the ESS, firms were also asked how they intended to deal with their shortage prob-
lems. Firm respondents were allowed to choose from an array of options. As shown in
1Specifically, the question asked is the following: How many vacancies for (occupation code) are proving
hard-to-fill?
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Table 1: Shortage share over survey waves
NRC RC
# HTF # vacancies Share # HTF # vacancies Share
1999 57403 134411 0.427 96345 241754 0.398
2001 117183 232219 0.504 120303 281733 0.427
2002 78575 177923 0.441 83601 216504 0.386
2011 38669 172816 0.223 37407 158703 0.235
2013 60123 189796 0.316 41301 164678 0.250
RM NRM
# HTF #vacancies Share # HTF # vacancies Share
1999 33358 60169 0.554 59833 121322 0.493
2001 33756 69367 0.486 84522 179505 0.470
2002 22519 52183 0.431 57812 114901 0.503
2011 4786 28520 0.167 25288 129694 0.194
2013 8524 24348 0.350 45701 152589 0.299
Fig. 1. Change in shortage share between 1999 and 2001 by occupation type
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Fig. 2. Change in shortage share between 2011 and 2013 by occupation type
Table 2: Strategies reportedly used to tackle shortage
Mostly NRC Mostly RC Mostly RM Mostly NRM
Increase salary 0.059 0.042 0.033 0.042
Provide training for incumbents 0.085 0.080 0.050 0.092
Redefine existing jobs 0.134 0.123 0.122 0.118
Increase recruitment intensity 0.378 0.382 0.364 0.464
Increase trainee programmes 0.089 0.072 0.055 0.068
Use new recruitment methods 0.372 0.306 0.321 0.330
Hire foreigners 0.043 0.027 0.029 0.048
Hire contractors 0.096 0.051 0.052 0.048
Train less qualified recruits 0.073 0.066 0.045 0.059
Increase job attractivity 0.017 0.011 0.014 0.010
Other 0.042 0.046 0.045 0.027
Nothing 0.127 0.132 0.149 0.107
Don’t know 0.014 0.022 0.027 0.028
No. of obs 1766 1815 2736 2835
The table shows the percentage of firms that adopt the above strategies to tackle occupational shortage. Firms are allowed
to cite more than one strategy, so the percentages do not sum to 1.
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Table 2, which uses data from the 2011 and 2013 waves, firms were most likely to increase
search intensity in attempting to fill hard-to-fill vacancies. The next two most commonly
cited strategies were ‘redefine existing jobs’, where existing employees perform the tasks of
unfilled vacancies, and ‘nothing’. Notably, raising wages and raising job attractiveness were
the least cited strategies firms would adopt. Some differences exist between the 4 broad
occupation groups. For instance, firms with predominantly routine shortage more frequently
cite doing ”Nothing”, while firms with predominantly NRC shortage more frequently cite
”Raising wages”.
To illustrate whether any of these differences in reported strategies are statistically sig-
nificant, Figures 3 and 4 present estimated marginal effects of simple probit regressions of
the select strategy choices on firm type category and controls such as industry, firm size
and region. Specifically, we consider whether or not key strategies, including raising wages
and increasing recruitment intensity, vary significantly across firms facing different shortage
types. We then run a probit regression with a set of firm controls including firm size, region
and industry fixed effects, where the dependent variable is a dummy equaling one if the firm
reports adopting that strategy in response to shortage and zero otherwise. The marginal
effects of having predominantly NRC, RC, RM, NRM on the strategies chosen are then plot-
ted in Figures 3 and 4.
As seen from Figures 3 and 4, firms facing shortage in NRC occupations are signifi-
cantly more likely to claim to increase recruitment intensity than those facing shortage in
RC and RM occupations, while firms with most of their shortage in NRM occupations are
significantly more likely to increase recruitment intensity than those with shortage in RM
occupations. As for wages, we find that firms with most of their shortage in NRC occupa-
tions more likely to claim to increase wages than all other firm types.
Having gone through firms’ reported strategies to deal with shortage, it should be noted
that there is no way to verify that firms even carried out these strategies and hence whether
their claims had any impact on labor market outcomes. As such, we consider outcomes such
as wages, hours worked and employment from the LFS to verify these ostensibly adopted
measures.
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Fig. 3. How predominant shortage type affects probability that the firm increase recruitment
intensity
Fig. 4. How predominant shortage type affects probability that the firm raises wages
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4. Empirical strategies
Here, we estimate the effects of shortage on key labor market outcomes - hourly wages,
hours worked and employment. Using several empirical strategies, we obtain a consistent
takeaway, that shortage leads to significant change in labor market outcome changes for
non-routine occupations but does not affect outcomes for routine occupations.
4.1. Individual Level Regression with Bartik Instruments
As the first empirical exercise, we run an individual-level regression model inspired by
Acemoglu, Autor, and Lyle (2004). We consider how labor market outcomes change when
shortage changes between two periods. The labor market outcomes we examine are hourly
wages, hours worked and employment. In our analysis, we consider a change in shortage
between 1999 and 2001, as well as between 2011 and 2013. These years were chosen for
analysis due to ESS data availability. This regression is run separately for each of the four
occupational categories.
yi,r,s,t = α0 + α1T + α1T ∗∆Shortager,s,t + β2Xi,r,s,t + γr + γs + γt + i,r,s,t
Where yi,r,s,t is the job market outcome (logged) for individual i at region r, industry s and
time t, Xi,r,s,t are the controls for individual i in region r, industry s at time t. γr, γs and γt
are region, industry and year effects. i,r,s,t is the error term. ∆Shortager,s,t is the change
in shortage share (logged) in region r and industry s in the two years up to year t, where
shortage share in a given occupation type is defined as No. of hard-to-fill vacancies in r, s, t
Total no. of vacancies in r, s, t
. Let T
be a dummy equaling 1 if the year is 2001 or 2013 and 0 if the year is 1999 or 2011. It
is helpful to think of the change in shortage as a ‘treatment’ that an individual in a given
occupation type undergoes while belonging to that region r, industry s at time t.
One concern is that ∆Shortager,s,t is likely endogenous, since other unobserved factors
time-varying local labor market conditions that affect wages, hours worked or employment
are probably affecting shortage as well. As such, we use Bartik instruments as IVs for the
shortage variable. Consider, for example, employment. Then, for each occupational category,






Shockr,s,t = ̂Employmentr,s,t − Employmentr,s,t−2
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where ̂Employmentr,s,t is the expected employment in region r, industry s at time t for
a given occupation type if employment had grown at the national rate for industry s over
the past two years. The Bartik instrument is thus the growth in employment in region r,
industry s that would have occurred between t and t − 2 had it grown at the national rate
for industry s.2 This ‘demand shock’ is orthogonal to any changes in local labor market
conditions at time t. Yet, this demand shock is also correlated with shortage, rendering it a
valid IV.3
Tables 3 and 4 show the regression results, for each of the four occupation categories,
in the individual-level regressions where the outcome variables are log hourly wage and log
hours worked. Thus, α1 can be interpreted as the percentage change in an individual’s labor
market outcome due to a one percentage increase in ∆Shortager,s,t. Standard demographic
controls including age, education, gender, ethnicity, as well as fixed effects for region, in-
dustry and survey wave are added. As seen in Table 3, a higher shortage increases wages
significantly for NRC and NRM jobs, but leads to no significant change for RC and RM
jobs. On the other hand, while a rise in shortage increases the number of hours worked
significantly for employees in NRC only, it does not not for RC, RM and NRM jobs.
Table 5 shows the regression results for the four categories with employment as the
outcome variable. How does a change in shortage affect the probability that an individual is
employed in a region and industry? For each of the 4 occupation categories, we let yr,s,t = 1
if an individual is employed in industry s and region r at time t and 0 otherwise. A probit
regression with the Bartik instruments is given Table 5. From Table 5, an increase in shortage
in NRC and NRM occupations significantly increases the probability that individuals are
employed in NRC and NRM jobs respectively. In contrast, a rise in shortage in RC and RM
jobs lead to a significant decrease in the probability of being employed in those occupations.
The individual-level regressions thus show that the while wages, hours worked and prob-
ability of employment increase significantly when the change in shortage increases for NRC
and NRM occupations, this is not true for RC and RM occupations. Does the same distinc-
tion between routine and non-routine occupations hold on the aggregate level using different
empirical strategies? We study this in the next section.
2Following Goldsmith-Pinkham, Sorkin, and Swift (2018), when we compute the national employment
growth rate for a specific industry and occupation, we exclude the region-industry cell for which we are
building the instrument.
3See Appendix B for the first stage regressions and the validity of the Bartik instrument.
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Table 3: Shortage and Wages (2SLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
wNRC wRC wRM wNRM
∆Shortager,s,T=1 ∗ T 0.624∗∗ -0.289 -0.396 0.0967∗∗∗
[0.250] [0.385] [0.289] [0.026]
FE (reg, ind, wave) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 13031 10673 2931 9275
R2 0.301 0.343 0.188 0.224
t statistics in brackets; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4: Shortage and Hours (2SLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
hrsNRC hrsRC hrsRM hrsNRM
∆Shortager,s,T=1 ∗ T 0.119∗ 0.141 -0.143 -0.118
[0.072] [0.276] [0.162] [0.169]
FE (reg, ind, wave) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 17674 1784 1132 2606
R2 0.021 0.107 0.088 0.095
t statistics in brackets; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 5: Shortage and Employment Pr. (2SLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
eNRC eRC eRM eNRM
∆Shortager,s,T=1 ∗ T 3.625∗∗ -4.725∗∗ -0.226 1.532∗
[1.837] [2.356] [0.164] [0.861]
FE (reg, ind, wave) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 74018 74018 74018 74018
R2 0.071 0.003 0.174 0.021
t statistics in brackets; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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4.2. Aggregate Level Regression - Dynamic GMM
For each occupation category, we run a dynamic Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)
model to ascertain if our previous results hold when using region-industry level data instead.
Individual-level data on wages and hours worked are aggregated such that for each region,
industry and occupation type, an average of wages and hours worked is constructed. In
addition, the average employment rate for each region, industry and occupation type is
measured in the following way. First, individuals living in a given region are considered
affiliated to a given industry and occupation type if they are currently employed in this
industry and occupation or if they are currently unemployed but their previous job belonged
to this industry and occupation type. Then, the region r, industry s and occupation j level
employment rate at time t is defined as
No. employedj,r,s,t
No. employedj,r,s,t+No. unemployedj,r,s,t
. For each occupation
type j, a separate regression is run. The regression model is as follows
yr,s,t = α + β0yr,s,t−1 + β1Shortager,s,t + β2Xr,s,t + γr + γs + r,s,t
Where Shortager,s,t is
No. of hard-to-fill vacanciesr,s,t
Total no. of vacanciesr,s,t
. yr,s,t is the job market outcome in region
r, industry s, and year t, Xr,s,t consists of control variables that affect outcomes yr,s,t for in
region r, industry s, and year t, γr and γs are regional and industry fixed effects respectively.
Taking the first difference to eliminate the fixed effects, we obtain for each occupation
type j
∆yr,s,t = β0∆yr,s,t−1 + β1∆Shortager,s,t + β2∆Xr,s,t + ∆r,s,t
∆yr,s,t−1 is clearly endogenous. Moreover, it is not unreasonable to think that ∆Shortager,s,t
and ∆Xr,s,t would be correlated with ∆r,s,t. As such, we adopt the Arellano-Bond estimator
by using the lags of the regressors as instruments. Note that while wage, hours worked and
employment data provided by the LFS is available for every year from 1999 to 2013, the
same cannot be said of the data on shortage, since the ESS was only conducted in five waves
over that period of time. As such, we impute data for the years during which the ESS was
not conducted, and we do it through moment-conserving interpolation.4 Tables 6, 7 and 8
present the results. As seen from the tables, the results tell a similar story to that told by the
individual-level regressions with Bartik Instruments. While for routine jobs, wages, hours
worked and employment rates increase significantly in response to an increase in shortage,
4For each occupation, we extract correlations of our measure of occupational shortage with LFS vari-
ables for the years when the ESS was conducted. Then, we compute moments (correlations) preserving
approximations of missing data point through polynomials and splines.
17
no significant response is observed for non-routine jobs.
Table 6: Shortage and Wages (DGMM)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
wNRC wRC wRM wNRM
L.Hourly wage 0.110 0.084∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.099∗
[0.069] [0.037] [0.037] [0.054]
Shortage 0.032∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.007 0.029∗∗
[0.012] [0.009] [0.014] [0.011]
Participation rate -0.007 0.004 - 0.000 0.088∗
[0.039] [0.050] [0.031] [0.046]
FE (reg, ind, year) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2139 2139 1947 1992
t statistics in brackets; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
errors clustered at r, s level
4.3. Aggregate results - VECM
In this section we study the aggregate effects of shortage on labor market outcomes. In




βj∆Xt−j + ΠXt−1 + t+1
Vector X contains logs of the hourly wage, employment rate, hours worked and our mea-
sure of shortage. Although all variables exhibit unit root, there is a cointegrating equation
when considering variables for NRM jobs. This implies that a simple VAR in difference
would be incorrect and deviations from a long-run equilibrium must be kept into account.
Such correction, here captured by Π, transforms the VAR in difference into a VECM when
considering NRC variables. For each occupation, the optimal number of lags is chosen via
LR information criteria (2 lags when considering NRC jobs, 2 for RC, 3 for RM, 2 for RM).
As Figures 5 to 8 show, a one percentage increase in shortage leads to a significant
adjustment in wages, and employment and hours worked for NRC and NRM occupations.
It is worth to notice the intriguing pattern of hours: as shortage hikes, the immediate
adjustment is through the intensive margin; only through time does the extensive margin
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Table 7: Shortage and Hours (DGMM)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
hrsNRC hrsRC hrsRM hrsNRM
L.Hours worked 0.169 0.236∗∗∗ 0.046 0.012
[0.152] [0.057] [0.056] [0.073]
Shortage 0.014∗∗∗ 0.016 -0.013 0.019∗
[0.005] [0.010] [0.013] [0.011]
Hourly wage -0.036 -0.092 0.181∗∗ 0.389∗∗∗
[0.040] [0.126] [0.077] [0.102]
FE (reg, ind, year) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2139 2139 1947 1992
t statistics in brackets; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
errors clustered at r, s level
Table 8: Shortage and Employment rate (DGMM)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
eNRC eRC eRM eNRM
L.employment rate 0.336∗∗∗ 0.320∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗ 0.045
[0.041] [0.042] [0.059] [0.043]
Shortage 0.008∗∗ 0.000 0.003 0.071∗
[0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.041]
Participation rate -0.008 0.030∗ 0.001 0.963∗∗∗
[0.011] [0.018] [0.006] [0.169]
FE (reg, ind, year) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2139 2139 1947 1992
t statistics in brackets; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
errors clustered at r, s level
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Fig. 5. Impulse Response Function (IRF) for NRC jobs
Fig. 6. Impulse Response Function (IRF) for RC jobs
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Fig. 7. Impulse Response Function (IRF) for RM jobs
Fig. 8. Impulse Response Function (IRF) for NRM jobs
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adjust while wages and hours worked diminish. We observe the same pattern for NRM job,
even though the magnitude of the adjustments of employment and wages is almost ten times
smaller with respect to NRC jobs. On the other hand, we do not observe a significant effect
of shortage on any other variable for RC and RM occupations, suggesting that these markets
-typically heavily hit by polarization- find it difficult to adjust (Figures 6 and 7).
4.4. Making sense of the results
While the results consistently show that a rise in wages, hours worked and employment
for non-routine occupations only, the question remains as to what drives these differences
between routine and non-routine occupations. Before embarking on a theoretical model,
we inspect the data further to reject or ascertain some possible hypotheses. We consider
the following: that there is systemic misreporting of shortage for routine vacancies, that
firms with hard-to-fill routine vacancies eventually outsource or mechanize them instead of
raising hours or wages and lastly, that instead of an occupation-based distinction, firms with
predominantly routine vacancies may be inherently less adept at filling their vacancies.
4.4.1. Systemic misreporting of shortage for routine vacancies
The simplest explanation for the above results could be that routine vacancies are system-
ically misreported in the ESS, such that hiring managers consistently over-report shortage
in routine jobs. Why this should be so is unclear, but we check for other evidence that
shortages in routine occupations have substantive impact to refute the notion that they are
empty claims. In the ESS, if a firm had at least 1 hard-to-fill vacancy in any occupation, it
was asked about the consequences of shortage for the firm. Specifically, firms were asked if
they had ended up shrinking their businesses or resorting to outsourcing and mechanization
as a consequence of their shortage problem. While these consequences are not independently
verifiable, they give us an idea of whether shortages in routine occupations actually matter,
even if these are rather descriptive.
We first run the following probit regression.
Pr(Shrink)i,t = α + β Firm Typei,t + γXi,t + i,t
Where Shrinki,t is a dummy equaling 1 if the firm says that the shortage is causing them
to shrink their operations, Firm typej,t refers to whether the firm has a majority of NRC,
RC, RM or NRM hard-to-fill vacancies and Xi,t consists of controls such as the size of the
firm, the industry and region in which it operates.
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Fig. 9. The effect of shortage type on the probability that the firm shrinks its operations
As shown in Figure 9, regardless of the kind of shortage they predominantly face, all
firm types have a significantly positive probability of shrinking as a result of shortage. Also,
firms facing shortage mainly in RM occupations are significantly more likely to shrink than
firms facing shortage in other occupations, thereby suggesting that claims of shortages in
RM occupations have substantive impact and may not be wholly empty.
In a similar vein, we next show that firms with shortages in RC occupations are signif-
icantly more likely to outsource. This finding also lends credence to claims of shortage for
routine occupations.
4.4.2. Outsourcing and mechanization
We first run the following probit regression.
Pr(Outsource)i,t = α + β Firm Typei,t + γXi,t + i,t
Where Outsourcei,t is a dummy equaling 1 if shortage would lead the firm to outsource.
Firm Typei,t and Xi,t are defined as before.
From Figure 10, we observe that irrespective of the type of shortage, all firms have a
23
Fig. 10. The effect of shortage type on the probability that the firm outsources
non-negligible probability of outsourcing. Also, while firms with shortage in routine occu-
pations are more likely than firms facing shortage in non-routine occupations, this is only
significant for firms with shortage in RC jobs (over firms with shortage in NRC jobs). Note
that this question was only included in the 2011 and 2013 waves of the ESS.
Concerning mechanization, we find that while firms facing all types of shortage have a
non-zero probability of mechanizing, the magnitudes are rather low and there is no significant
difference between routine and non-routine jobs. Note that this question was only asked in
the 1999, 2001 and 2002 waves of the ESS. The regression run is
Pr(Mechanize)i,t = α + β Firm Typei,t + γXi,t + i,t
Where Mechanizei,t is a dummy equaling 1 if shortage results in mechanization, where
Firm Typei,t and Xi,t are defined as before.
In short, the above results suggest that claims of shortage in routine jobs are not empty
and they do seem to have concrete impacts on firm behaviour. In particular, shortage in
the RM and RC occupation types are more likely to lead to shrinking and outsourcing
respectively, which could account for why wages, hours worked and employment are not
24
Fig. 11. The effect of shortage type on the probability that the firm mechanizes
observed to increase in response to shortage for routine jobs.
4.4.3. Selective migration patterns
The last possibility we consider is that workers in routine jobs may for some reason be
unable to move into pockets of higher shortage, which can explain why we do not observe
any increases in wage or employment outcomes in areas with higher shortage. The LFS,
though not a panel survey, does ask individual respondents about the region in which they
lived and worked in the previous year. We run the following two regressions.
Pr(Get a new job in a SP)i,t = α0 + α1Jobi,t + βXi,t + i,t
and
Pr(Get a new job in a SP | Change region)i,t = α0 + α1Jobi,t + βXi,t + i,t
Where Jobi,t is the current occupation type of individual i, and Xi,t includes individual
controls such as age, gender, marital status and education.
Figures 12 and 13 show that NRC workers are more likely to move to higher shortage
regions than other worker types. What is more, even when considering only workers who
did migrate to a different region, NRC worker-migrants are most likely to have moved into
25
Fig. 12. Probability that a worker in a particular occupation type migrates into a region
with higher shortage
Fig. 13. Probability that a worker in a particular occupation type moves into a region with
higher shortage given he/she migrates
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a region with higher shortage in their occupation type. Hence, it seems that the differential
rates of movement into higher shortage regions may play a role in the empirical findings,
although it is hitherto unclear why non-NRC workers choose not to migrate to higher shortage
pockets. Plausible reasons could be high fixed costs of migration or social transfers that
mitigate the push and pull factors for migration, but these demand further investigation.
5. The Model
In this section, we build and estimate a search-and-matching model in order to understand
(i) what drives occupational shortage, and (ii) why there are heterogeneous effects of shortage
across occupations and markets, and (iii) who migrates towards higher shortage pockets.
The model combines elements of a Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides framework with models
of directed search and wage posting as in Huckfeldt (2016), Guerrieri et al. (2017) and
Rogerson et al. (2005).
5.1. Set Up
Time is continuous. We imagine a world with a number I of “islands”. Each island
i = {1, 2, ..., I} is a separate market inhabited by a unitary and infinitely-living mass of
workers. Each worker is characterized by a skill-level x drawn from a uniform distribution
U[0,1], and can be either unemployed or employed in a specific occupation. On each island i,
there are two different occupations o = {1, 2}: the first occupation (o = 1) is skill-intensive,
whereas the second one (o = 2) is skill-neutral. Moreover, within each island, occupations
differ also in technology zi,o which follows a “island-specific” stochastic process over time.
Given technology, firms endogenously choose the number of vacancy vi,o for each segment
of the labor-market and post wages wi,o. Given technology, the wages and the vacancy
posted in each market, unemployed workers on island i direct their search only towards the
sub-market with higher unemployment value. Upon deciding on their occupation, workers
choose whether or not migrate to another island. If they do, they pay a moving cost. Then,
the matching process in each submarket begins, with the new employed workers starting
production at the beginning of the next period. Figure 5.1 represents the stylized time-line
of the model for the ith-island.
5.2. Productions, Technologies and Vacancies
There are two job-specific production functions:
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yi,1(x, zi,1) = zi,1x ; yi,2(x, zi,2) = zi,2.
Under this formulation, the production is skill-intensive in the first occupation, where a
worker x has linear returns to his own skill-level. On the other hand, the production in the
second job depends only on technology such that this job is skill-neutral.
Each technology follows a continuous-time AR(1) process of the form:
dzi,o = −ρzi,odt+ σodBi
where dBi is a standard-normal Brownian motion for island i. Despite heterogeneity in the
innovation process across islands, we assume that the technology process zi,o has common
standard deviation across all islands, i.e. σi,o = σo, ∀i = {1, 2, ..., I} and ∀o = {1, 2}.
Similarly, we assume that the persistence of the shock ρ is common across islands and
occupations.
Given this, the value of production of a worker x when employed in occupation o on
island i is:
rJ(x, zi,o) = yi,o(x, zi,o)− w(x, zi,o)− δEzi,o{J(x, z′i,o)− V (z′i,o)}
where r is the interest rate, δ is the exogenous separation rate, w(x, zi,o) is the wage paid to
the worker, and V (z′i,o) is the value of posting a vacancy in the labor market o on island i.
Similarly, vacancy posting evolves according to the following Bellman equation:
rV (zi,o) = −c+m(θi,o)Ezi,o{J(x, z′i,o)− V (z′i,o)}
where c is the cost of creating a vacancy, whereas m(θi,o) is the probability for the firm on
island i to fill a vacancy vi,o. This probability is function of θi,o, i.e. the job-specific market
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where ψ is the matching elasticity, α is the return on vacancy posting, and si,o is the number
of searchers in market o on island i.
5.3. Employment and Unemployment Value, and the Direction of Search
For a worker x employed in occupation o on island i, the value of employment is:
rN(x, zi,o) = w(x, zi,o)− δEzi,o{N(x, z′i,o)− U(x, z′i,o′)}
where N(x, z′i,o) is the value of working in job o in the next period, and U(x, z
′
i,o′) is the value
of being unemployed in the next period and searching in market o′, with o′ not necessarily
equal to the current o.
When an unemployed worker with skill-level x from island i searches in market o, his
value of employment is:
rU(x, zi,o) = b+ q(θi,o)Ezi,o{N(x, z′i,o)− U(x, z′i,o′)}
where b is the unemployment benefit, q(θi,o) = θ
1−α
i,o is the probability for an unemployed
worker to fill a vacancy vi,o. Again, N(x, z
′
i,o) is the value of working in job o in the next
period, whereas U(x, z′i,o′) is the value of searching in market o
′ in the next period, with
o′ not necessarily equal to the current o. In fact, for a change in technology between two
consecutive periods, the worker might want to change the direction of his search towards
other jobs. This happens if and only if U(x, zi,o′) > U(x, zi,o). In other words, each period




Hence, for each island i there exists a value xˆi such that a worker with skill-level x = xˆi
is indifferent between searching for a skill-intensive or a skill-neutral job on island i. This
argument leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 1. On each island i, all workers x > xˆi search for job o = 1 since U(x, zi,1) >
U(x, zi,2), ∀x > xˆi. All workers x ≤ xˆi search for job o = 2 since U(x, zi,1) ≤ U(x, zi,2),
∀x ≤ xˆi.
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Proof. Since o = 1 is skill-intensive, the value of unemployment for a worker x searching in
this market is increasing in his own skills, i.e. ∂U(x, zi,1)/∂x > 0 and ∂
2U(x, zi,1)/∂x
2 = 0.
On the contrary, since o = 2 is skill-neutral, the value of unemployment for a worker x
searching in this market is independent of skills, i.e. ∂U(x, zi,2)/∂x = 0. Therefore, U(x, zi,1)
is a linear and increasing function of x and intersects U(x, zi,0) from below only once. This
grants the existence and uniqueness of a value of xˆi such that U(x, zi,1) > U(x, zi,2), ∀x >
xˆi.
In light of this, the equilibrium condition pinning down the direction of the search is the
following:
U(xˆi, zi,1) = U(xˆi, zi,2) , ∀i = {1, 2, ..., I}. (1)
5.4. Choice of Migration
Upon choosing occupation o on island i, a worker can decide whether or not to migrate
to island i′ and search for the same occupation. The worker pays moving cost c(x) if he
decides to move. Hence, the worker’s choice of location l is such that
l = argmax
i∈I
{U(x, zi,o);U(x, zi′,o)− c(x)}
Therefore, for every occupation o on island i there will be a threshold x˜i,o such that the
following holds:
U(x˜i,o, zi′,o)− U(x˜i,o, zi,o) = c(x˜i,o) , ∀o = {1, 2}, ∀i′ 6= i. (2)
The level of such a threshold depends on the functional form of c(x). In fact, if c(x) = c,
given the above stated properties of U(x, zi,o), a fraction of workers searching in occupation
o = 1, who satisfy x ≥ x˜i,1 will migrate. On the other hand, for workers searching in
occupation o = 2, there will be a corner solution. Specifically, as long as U(x, zi′,2) −
U(x, zi,2) ≥ c, all workers will migrate and x˜i,2 = 0. Otherwise, no worker will migrate since
x˜i,2 = xˆi.
If c is a function of x, then an interior solution exists for both sectors. In other words,
for both o = {1, 2}, there will be x˜i,o such that only workers with x > x˜i,o will migrate.
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5.5. Wage Posting
Every employer of type o = {1, 2} posts wages in order to maximize the probability that
workers will search in sub-market o, i.e. in order to increase the value U(x, zi,o), ∀x. Since
the employer cannot choose technology, the only channel through which he can raise the
wage and influence search behavior is through the job-specific market tightness θi,o. This




such that the equilibrium condition for job-specific market tightness simply is:
∂Ex{U(x, zi,o)}
∂θi,o
= 0 , ∀o = {1, 2} and ∀i = {1, 2, ..., I}. (3)
5.6. Employment Dynamics
The evolution of employment in each sub-market o on each island i is:
∂ni,o
∂t
= si,oq(θi,o)− δni,o (4)
i.e. the time-change of the employment stock in occupation o on island i is equal to the flow
of workers from unemployment to job o (si,oq(θi,o)) net of workers who lost their jobs due to
exogenous displacement (δni,o).
5.7. The Equilibrium
Under this set-up, now we define the equilibrium condition for the economy.
Definition 1. Conditional on the stochastic technological process zi,1 and zi,2, the equilib-
rium for the economy is a vector {θi,o, ni,o, xˆi, x˜i,o}∞t=0 satisfying equations (1)-(4) for each
occupation o = {1, 2} on each island i = {1, 2, ..., I}.
We can now proceed by describing how we estimate the model. Thereafter, we show
simulations using the estimated parameters in order to understand the mechanics of the
model, how shortage affects wages and employment and under which conditions the model
generates the comovements observed in the data.
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6. Model Calibration
In this section, we bring the model to the data. Instead of considering four different
occupations, as in the empirical part of this paper, we reduce our analysis only to two jobs:
(i) non-routine jobs i.e. the sum of non-routine cognitive and non-routine manual jobs, and
(ii) routine jobs i.e. the sum of routine cognitive and routine manual jobs. For these two
major groups, we build time-series for employment, wages and shortage at regional-industrial
level. Then we calculate the average correlation of wages and employment with respect to
shortage, and the average employment rate for non-routine occupations and its variance
across markets. Once we collect these moments from the data, we move to the estimation.
First of all, we preset some parameters with standard values from the literature: r =
0.015, b = 0.4, δ = 0.1, c = 0.2 and ρ = 0.95 as in Shimer (2005); α = 0.5 and ψ = 1 as in
Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001). For simplicity, we set zi,2 = 1 for all islands i = {1, 2, ..., I},
whereas we allow zi,1 to differ across islands. Finally, we assume that there are 100 islands,
i.e. I = 100, and that technologies in the two occupations are shocked for 200 consecutive
periods. The list of preset parameters is given in Table 9.
Table 9: Preset Parameters
Parameter Description Value
r Interest rate 0.015
b Value of leisure 0.40
δ Separation rate 0.10
c Vacancy cost 0.20
α Matching elasticity 0.5
ψ Matching efficiency 1
zi,2 Skill-neutral tech. 1
ρ Shock persistency 0.95
Second, we assume zi,1
i.i.d∼ N(µz1 , νz1), i.e. the technology of the skill-intensive occupation
is on average equal to µz1 across islands, and the dispersion of such productivity is equal to
νz1 . Finally, we assume quadric moving costs, i.e. c(x) =
1
2
(κ−x)2. Therefore, the unknown
parameters of the model are µz1 , νz1 , σ1, σ2 and κ, and we estimate them by simulated
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method of moments. In particular, we use the average employment rate for non-routine jobs
and its standard deviation across region-industry cells to estimate the mean productivity of
non-routine jobs µz1 and its standard deviation νz1 across all I islands. Then we use the
correlation of wages and employment with respect to shortage for each occupation, to back
up the volatility σ1 and σ2 of the stochastic technological process over time. The fraction
of movers across region-industry cells identifies κ. Therefore, there are 7 moments for 5
unknown parameters. The list of estimated parameters is given in Table 10, while the list
of targeted moments with the model and data values and the corresponding test statistics is
given in Table 11.
Table 10: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Description Value
µz1 Mean skill-intensive tech. 1.940
νz1 Skill-intensive tech. dispersion 0.046
σ1 Std. for skill-intensive shocks 0.110
σ2 Std. for skill-neutral shocks 0.0001
κ Cost function param. 2.473
Table 11: Targeted moments and model moments
Moment Data Model Test stat.
n1 across islands 0.56 0.54 4.97
Std(n1) across islands 0.03 0.02 19.71
Corr(n1, Shortage1) 0.18 0.12 1.83
Corr(n2, Shortage2) 0.05 0.01 0.18
Corr(w1, Shortage1) 0.09 0.15 2.22
Corr(w2, Shortage2) 0.01 0.005 0.07
Sh. of movers across islands 0.042 0.045 6.56
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From Table 10, notice that skill-intensive technology is on average almost twice more
productive than skill neutral technology (µz1 = 1.94) across islands. The dispersion across
islands of such productivity is relatively small (νz1 = 0.046), i.e. the level of skill-intensive
technology does not vary much across islands. The parameter characterizing the moving-cost
function is high (κ = 2.473), thus allowing only few workers to move across islands. The
standard deviation of the stochastic technological process is way higher in the skill-intensive
market (σ1 >> σ2).
5 This is key to explain the uneven adjustments to shortage across jobs
and markets as observed in the data. In fact, from Table 11, this parametrization leads
to positive and significant correlations of employment and wages only in the skill-intensive
occupation such that the model is consistent with the results from the empirical part of this
paper (Section 4). Moreover, this parameterization sheds light on which type of technological
change is needed to generate correlations close to the ones observed: in fact, with σ1 >> σ2,
i.e. with the skill-intensive market being relatively more volatile, the skill-intensive technol-
ogy will always react more to a shock. Hence, technological shocks are always biased towards
this market. This is what we mean by SBTC.
In the next section, we develop the argument on SBTC by running impulse responses
functions (IRFs) under the estimated parametrization and discuss the mechanics of the
model. Then we run some counterfactuals to show that SBTC is necessary for the model to
stay close to the data. Finally, we discuss the skill distribution of migrants across islands.
7. Discussion
7.1. IRFs and Model Mechanism
Here, we plot impulse responses for the “average-island”, i.e. an island with zi,1 = µz1 .
First of all, we show how the average economy reacts to a 1-standard-deviation shock in each
segment of the labor market separately. Then we repeat the exercises by shocking technology
in both segments at the same time.
Consider first Figure 15. Here we consider a one single positive shock on z1. On impact,
technology increases by σ1 in the skill-intensive segment of the labor market. This generates
an immediate rise in vacancy posting in this market, i.e. firms post more vacancies in the
market that has suddenly become more productive. Such vacancy posting behavior leads to
an increase in the share of unfilled vacancies (1−m(θ1)) so that shortage increases as well,
5In Appendix C we show the shape of the loss function.
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Fig. 15. IRFs for a z1 shock


































































i.e. firms find it hard to fill the posted vacancies. As a reaction firms post higher wages in
order to attract more workers into this market. The increase of w1 is large enough to change
the direction of the search for many workers. In fact, xˆ falls by 12%, i.e. more workers
search in the skill-intensive market. As a consequence, employment in the skill-intensive
sector rises. The dynamics in the skill-neutral sector are different. First of all, due to the
fact that now more workers are searching somewhere else, the lower-tier market experiences
some shortage as well, but for different reasons. Employers in this segment post just a few
vacancies to try to maintain the stock of incumbent workers. For this purpose they also raise
wages, but not as much as in the skill-intensive job. Yet, the net effect is negative and the
stock of employment in the skill-neutral market still falls.
To sum-up, for a SBTC shock, the model generates a positive correlation of wages and
employment with shortage only in the skill-intensive market.
Consider now Figure 16. Here we consider a one single positive shock on z2. Now, the
result is opposite to the SBTC case: shortage and wages increase more than proportionally
in the skill-neutral sector so to attract more workers and increase the stock of employment
here.
Finally, consider the case in which both jobs benefits from a technological shock at the
same time. Which effect prevails? The fact that the skill-sensitive market is more sensitive
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Fig. 16. IRFs for a z2 shock



































































to shocks than the skill-neutral one, means that the effects of SBTC prevail. Figure 17 shows
results for this scenario.
In light of this analysis, we conclude that SBTC must be the prevailing technological
process across islands and over time. This is consistent with the literature on job and wage
polarization and SBTC as in Acemoglu (2002), Autor (2007), Acemoglu and Autor (2011b)
where they show that it is an unbalanced technological change that causes the increase of
vacancy posting and salaries in non-routine occupations, job and wage polarization. This
theoretical part builds on this and shows that the main driver of shortage and the uneven
adjustment of labor markets to shortage is indeed skill-biased technical change.6
7.2. The Skill-Distribution of Migrants and Frequency of Migration Flows
The world we described so far is characterized by I separate islands. Each of them differs
from the others on the level of skill-intensive technology zi,1 and the stochastic technological
processes dzi,o. This heterogeneity is the determinant of migration flows across islands.
However, the possibility of migrating is limited by the capacity of each worker to pay moving
cost c(x). In this section, we study the role of skills in determining migration. By running
6See Appendix D for the case in which both technologies change by the same amount when hit by a
shock.
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Fig. 17. IRFs for a z1 and z2 shock





































































a simulation across all I islands for 200 periods, we backup (i) the frequency of islands
experience migration outflows and the skill-distribution of migrants in these islands.
Consider the left-panel of Figure 18. Here we plot the frequency of islands experiencing
migration outflows over the minimum skill-level required in those islands in order to move
and cover the moving-cost. Out of our simulation, only 4.5% of our sample experienced
migration flows. In those cases, migrants are coming from the top of the skill distribution.
In fact, in 2% of islands, the skill-level of migrants lies within the [0.8 − 0.9] bin, while in
the other 2.5% of islands, it falls within the [0.9 − 1.0] bin. In other words, there is only
a small share of islands experiencing migration outflows. Within these islands, most of the
time, migrants belong to the top percent decile of the skill distribution.
When considering the probability for workers to migrate (Figure 18, right panel) over
the minimum skill-level, we see that the probability is declining with the minimum skill
threshold: the lower the threshold x˜i,o, the higher the probability for workers to migrate.
But, as explained above, most of the time migrants come from the top percent decile, meaning
that there are very few migrants in the entire economy and that they come from the top of
the skill-distribution.
Finally, since migrants have such high skills, they (almost) always search for skill-intensive
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Fig. 18. Migration Flows and Skill Distribution
Fig. 19. Which jobs do migrants get? What is their education?
job. In this sense, migrants are most of the times very skilled, they searcher for a skill-
intensive job and, if they can, they self-select in shortage pockets where salaries are higher
and job opportunities bigger. This prediction of the model is in line with what we observe
in the data. Consider the probability of moving into shortage pockets (islands) as a function
of the job workers obtained by migrating, as shown in the left panel of Figure 19. 6 %
of workers in self-select into higher shortage pockets in occupation 1, significant at the 5
percent level. On the other hand, only a insignificant 2% moves for occupation 2. When we
study the same probability as a function of education -a proxy for skills in the model- we
see that it is always workers with a tertiary education degree that are most likely to move
and self-select into shortage pockets.
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8. Conclusions
In this paper, we have discussed the existence and incidence of occupational shortage,
as well as the resultant labor market adjustments. Adopting a measure of shortage given
by the number of hard-to-fill vacancies in the Employer Skills Survey conducted in the UK,
we show that wages increase in response to labor market shortage only in non-routine jobs,
leading to an eventual increase in employment, while no such response is observed in routine
jobs. This finding is robust to different empirical strategies and levels of aggregation.
Examining the reasons for the discrepancy between routine and non-routine jobs, we
find no evidence that there is systemic over-reporting of shortage for routine jobs by human
resource managers relative to that for non-routine jobs. Instead, this empirical finding seems
to be in line with the secular decline of routine jobs, which has been also cited as one of
the driving forces behind job polarization. The secular decline of routine jobs leads to the
relative fall in wages and the exit of workers from this sector, thereby increasing the difficulty
with which such jobs are filled.
The stylized theoretical model presented in this paper confirms this initial intuition.
Characterizing local labor markets by their broad occupation type - routine and non-routine,
as well as by location, this paper has demonstrated how SBTC can account for the different
responses of routine and non-routine occupations to shortage. While having previously been
shown to account for the decline in wages and employment in routine occupations, SBTC can
also be behind the routine sector’s inability to mitigate shortage. Moreover, the model also
makes predictions on the migration patterns of workers into shortage pockets that are in line
with the data. Highly-skilled workers, most often affiliated to the non-routine occupation, are
most likely to migrate into pockets of higher shortage. The extent to which these differences
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Appendix A. Further empirical details
A.1. More descriptive statistics
Figure A.1 shows the evolution of shortage share from 1999 to 2013 over the 9 adminis-
trative regions of England for each occupation category. In the long run, from 1999 to 2013,
shortage declines across all regions and all 4 occupations. Yet, substantial variation exists
across local labor markets. For NRC jobs, for instance, shortage has declined the least in
London, the East of England and the South East, while declining far more in Yorkshire and
the Humber, the North East, North West and the West Midlands. In contrast, for RC jobs,
shortage has decreased the least in the North West, West Midlands, as well as London. De-
spite the overall long run declining trend, there is substantial variation in shortage changes
between regions, as well as in the short run. We exploit this variation across local labor
markets later in the subsequent empirical strategy.
Figure A.2 gives the overall shortage change by industry over time from 1999 to 2013
separately for each occupation. Observe that within each occupation category, there is
some heterogeneity in shortage share changes across industries. For NRC jobs, while most
industries experienced a decline in shortage share from 1999 to 2013, Mining, Manufacturing
and Public Administration faced an increase in shortage share. For RC jobs, shortage share
for all industries decreased during the time period except for Education. On the contrary,
for RM jobs, half of the industries had an increase in shortage share and the other half
experienced a decrease. Lastly, for NRM jobs, only Transport and Finance faced a rise in
their shortage shares.
A.2. The role of firm-specific characteristics
It is also possible that instead of a distinction between routine and non-routine jobs,
it could be that firms that have more routine vacancies are somehow less able to fill their
vacancies. Otherwise put, the empirical findings could be due to firm-specific characteristics
instead of occupation-specific ones. As such, examining whether firms with multiple hard-
to-fill vacancy types treat routine and non-routine types of shortage differently would be
helpful in ruling out (or not) this hypothesis.
Figure A.3 shows the variety of vacancies among small, medium and large firms7. Variety
equals 1 if, for example, the firm only has NRC vacancies and equals 4 if the firm has unfilled
7A small firm is defined as one with between 5 to 49 employees, a medium firm between 50 and 249
employees and a large firm 250 employees and above.
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(c) Non-Routine Cognitive (d) Routine Cognitive
(e) Routine Manual (f) Non-Routine Manual
Fig. A.1. Overall change in shortage share by region and occupation category between 1999
and 2013
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(a) Non-Routine Cognitive (b) Routine Cognitive
(c) Routine Manual (d) Non-Routine Manual
Fig. A.2. Evolution of shortage share by industry and occupation category between 1999
and 2013
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Fig. A.3. The variety of vacancies posted by each firm
vacancies in all 4 job types. We observe that firms report unfilled vacancies in only 1 job
type, meaning the distinction between firm effects and effects of vacancy types is moot.
Hence, this hypothesis cannot be further discussed.
Appendix B. Bartik Instrument: 1st Stage
Here we report the first-stage regressions for the 2SLS estimation described in Section
4.1. Table 12, 13, 14 report results for the three dependent variables (wages, hours worked
and probability of employment) in each occupation.
As is evident, the instrument is strong enough when instrumenting our shortage measure
for NRC and NRM jobs. On the contrary, the Bartik instrument is weak (but still significant)
for RC and RM occupations.
Appendix C. The Loss-Function
As discussed in Section 6, we estimate the model by simulated method of moments, i.e.
we minimize the following loss-function:
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Table 12: Shortage and Wages (1st stage)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ShortageNRC ∆ShortageRC ∆ShortageRM ∆ShortageNRM
Bartik Shock 0.0993∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗ 0.160∗ 0.416∗∗
[0.026] [0.049] [0.086] [0.185]
FE (reg, ind, wave) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 13031 10673 2931 9275
R2 0.237 0.137 0.181 0.141
t statistics in brackets; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 13: Shortage and Hours (1st stage)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ShortageNRC ∆ShortageRC ∆ShortageRM ∆ShortageNRM
Bartik Shock 0.103∗∗∗ 0.0384∗ 0.157∗ 0.525∗∗∗
[0.026] [0.021] [0.092] [0.188]
FE (reg, ind, wave) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 17674 1784 1132 2606
R2 0.244 0.135 0.181 0.109
t statistics in brackets; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01









t statistics in brackets; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Fig. C.4. Calibration
L(P ) = [m−m(P )]′W [m−m(P )]
with W being an identity matrix, m is vector of observed moments and m(P ) is the
vector of moments generated from the vector of parameters P = [µz1 , νz1 , σ1, σ2]. In order to
minimize this function, our algorithm develops in three steps: first, we build a grid of points
in the parameter space; then, for every combination of points, we simulate 100 separate
economies (islands) for 200 hundred periods and collect moments for each one. Finally, we
average out the moments across islands and build the loss-function L(P).
Figure C.4 plots the loss-function aver a grid of values in the parameter space R4. This
function is convex in the R4 space and has minimum at P ∗ ∈ R4.
48
Appendix D. Same Technology Change across Markets
In Section 7, we discussed the effect of technological change when a shock hits a segment
of the labor market at different intensity, i.e. when σ1 6= σ2. Here, we want to study the
effects of a shock that impact both technologies zi,1 and zi,2 in the same way. Specifically, we
consider the scenario in which both technology becomes 5% more productive when a shock
hits. Given the estimated average level across island µz1 = z¯1 = 1.94, and zi,2 = 1 across
all islands I, this is equivalent to imposing σ1 = 0.097 and σ2 = 0.05. Figure D.5 plots the
Irfs for this case. As evident, variables comove across markets when technologies change
by the same amount. However, there are some facts to highlight. First, wages react in the
same way to the shock i.e. they increase both by 5%. Second, although the same wage
adjustment, there are more workers looking into the skill-intensive market, where they can
have a higher salary (in level) and a higher return to skills. Third, skill shortage increases
in both markets, but -due to the change in the direction of the search for some workers- the
skill-neutral market experiences larger occupational shortage. Finally, as a consequence to
all of this, employment increases more in the skill-intensive market when the shock hits, and
the employment dynamic is way more persistent here than in the skill-neutral market.
To sum up, for a common technological shock across jobs, firms adjust wages upward by
the same amount. Yet, the skill-intensive market is able to attract more workers such that it
is able to persistently hire more workers than the skill-neutral one. In other words, a common
technology shock makes the wage-posting channel irrelevant. It is purely the different return
to skills across sectors that explain the uneven adjustments in terms of employment.
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Fig. D.5. IRFs: same tech. change across markets
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